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Decreased tracking, increased earning: Evidence from 
the comprehensive Polish educational reform of 1999 
 
Luca Flóra Drucker - Dániel Horn 
 
Abstract 
 
The Polish educational reform in 1999 is often considered successful as the results of the 
Polish students, and especially that of the low-performers, on the OECD PISA tests have 
improved significantly since the introduction of the new system. The reform extended the 
previous 8-year undivided comprehensive education to 9 years, core curricula were 
introduced and the examination, admission and assessment systems were changed. It has 
been argued before that this longer comprehensive education improved the test performance 
of worse performing students; hence increasing average performance and decreasing inter-
school variation of test scores. However, the lack of reliable impact assessment on long-run 
labour market effects of this reform is awaiting. 
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by looking at the causal effects of the reform. By 
comparing the labour market outcomes of the pre- and post-reform cohorts, we find a non-
negligible and positive effect. We look at employment and wages as outcomes. Using data 
from the EU-Statistics on Income and Living conditions, and pooling the waves between 
2005 and 2013 and taking the 20-27 year-olds, we generate a quasi-panel of observations to 
estimate the treatment effect by difference-in-difference estimation. 
We find evidence that the reform was successful on the long-run: the post-reform group is 
more likely to be employed and they also earn higher wages. On average, the treatment group 
is around 2-3% more likely to be employed, which effect is driven by the lowest educated. The 
post-reform cohort also earns more: we find an over 3% difference in real wages, which is 
also more pronounced for the lowest educated. 
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Kisebb szelekció, nagyobb kereset: Az 1999-es lengyel 
oktatási reform hatásának vizsgálata  
 
Drucker Luca Flóra – Horn Dániel 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Az 1999-es lengyel közoktatási reformot gyakran tartják sikeresnek, mivel a lengyel diákok, és 
különösen a rosszul teljesítő diákok, OECD PISA teszteken elért eredményei szignifikánsan 
javultak az új rendszer bevezetése óta. A reform az eredetileg 8 évig tartó alapoktatást egy 
évvel, 9 évre hosszabbította meg, bevezetett egy központi alaptantervet, és megváltoztatta a 
vizsgák, a felvételik és az értékelések rendszerét is. Számos szerző a meghosszabbított 
alapképzésnek tulajdonítja a rosszabbul teljesítő diákok teszteredményeinek javulását, és 
ennek eredményeképp az átlagosan javuló teszteredményeket és a pontszámok csökkenő 
varianciáját. A reform hosszú távú, munkaerőpiaci hatásáról azonban mindezidáig nem 
készült kutatás. 
Ebben a tanulmányban ezt a hiányt igyekszünk pótolni. Összehasonlítva a reform előtti és 
reform utáni kohorszok munkaerőpiaci jellemzőit arra a megállapításra jutunk, hogy a 
reformnak nem elhanyagolható, pozitív hatása volt a munkaerőpiaci esélyekre és a bérekre. 
Az EU-SILC 2005 és 2013 közötti adatbázisait használva egy kvázi-panel adatbázist hozunk 
létre a 20-27 éves fiatalokra. Ennek segítségével különbség-a-különbségekben módszer 
segítségével becsüljük a reform oksági hatását.  
Bizonyítékot találunk arra, hogy a reform utáni kohorszok tanulói nagyobb valószínűséggel 
találnak állást és magasabb béreket keresnek. Összességében a kezelt csoport 2-3%-kal 
nagyobb valószínűséggel less foglalkoztatott, amely hatás a legalacsonyabb végzettségű 
munkavállalók megnövekedett esélyeinek tulajdonítható. A reform utáni kohorszok kb. 3%-
kal magasabb béreket kapnak, amely különbség szintén nagyobb az alacsonyabban 
végzettekre. 
 
Tárgyszavak: Oktatási reform, Lengyelország, szelekció, munkaerőpiac, különbség-a-
különbségekben módszer 
 
JEL kódok: I21, I24, I26, J24 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Poland is often mentioned as a miracle in the OECD PISA reports (e.g. OECD 2010), due to 
the fact that the students’ average test scores have improved significantly during the first 
decade of this century. From the PISA 2000, the average test scores in reading have 
skyrocketed from below the OECD average to being one of the forerunners within the OECD. 
Similar trends are apparent in math. These improvements are claimed to be the effect of the 
1999 educational reform (Jakubowski 2015).1 
In 1999, the Polish education system has been reformed greatly. The age of first selection 
was postponed from age 14 to 15 and thus, the number of years spent in general training was 
increased from eight to nine years. The former 8-year-long general school (primary and lower 
secondary level) was replaced by a 6-year-long primary and a 3-year-long lower secondary 
school. The compulsory years spent in education were also increased from 17 to 18, which 
change affected mainly students in the basic vocational schools (Jakubowski et al. 2010; 
Jung-Miklaszewska 2003). Besides this structural reform, several other changes were carried 
out: the curriculum, the examination, admission and assessment systems were all reformed.  
In this paper, we take a look at the long run effects of this reform. There are a couple of 
studies that has looked at the long-run effects of similar reforms in the Scandinavian 
countries. Meghir and Palme (2005) and Pekkarinen, Uusitalo and Kerr (2009) have shown 
in the case of Sweden and Finland, respectively, that similar comprehensive education 
reforms helped to decrease inequalities by increasing the outcomes for the lower status 
people. These reforms took place in the 1950s in Sweden and in the 1970s in Finland. Both 
countries abolished tracking and both imposed a national curriculum on schools and 
lengthened compulsory schooling to 9 years from 7 or 8. Meghir and Palme (2005) 
demonstrated that the reform increased both the attainment and the later earnings of 
children with lowly educated parents. At the same time, the reform also decreased the 
earnings of those with highly educated parents. Pekkarinen, Uusilato and Kerr (2009) tested 
the effects of the Finnish comprehensive reform and concluded that it had only a small but an 
overall positive effect. It significantly reduced intergenerational income elasticity for boys, 
and it increased intergenerational income mobility. The novelty of these studies is that they 
could test the causal effects of an educational reform using difference-in-difference estimates 
exploiting the fact that the reform was implemented gradually across the countries. 
                                                 
1 The Ministry of National Education of Poland also praises the 1999 reform. see: “Diversification of 
PISA survey results – lower secondary schools in Poland provide equal opportunities.”  
http://men.gov.pl/en/?p=45 (Last downloaded on 7 March 2016.) 
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While the Polish reform of 1999 was similar in many aspects to the Scandinavian reforms 
it was introduced at one point in time for the whole country. Thus, we will compare the 
employment chances and real wages of pre-reform (control) and post-reform (treatment) 
cohorts directly. Pooling several years of cross-sectional surveys we generate a quasi-panel of 
time of survey and age brackets, which we will use to estimate difference-in-difference 
estimates, but unlike in the Scandinavian studies, the variance comes not from the time of 
implementation but from the time (year) of observation. 
Results suggest that the 1999 reform in Poland was successful on the long-run. The post-
reform group is more likely to be employed and they also earn higher wages. Similarly to the 
Scandinavian studies, this effect is likely to be driven by the lowest educated, which suggests 
that the reform has reached its initial goal of decreasing inequalities. 
2. THE EDUCATIONAL REFORM OF 1999 IN POLAND  
During the transition from socialism to democracy, several parts of the Polish education 
system have changed. The system gradually became more decentralized, schools became 
more autonomous, ideological elements of history teaching were eliminated and The Russian 
language was not compulsory anymore. However, by the middle of the 1990s, the results of 
the International Adult Literacy Survey revealed further deficiencies in the education system 
and that urged the need for a major educational reform (see Wiśniewski 2001). 
The educational reform of 1999 was one of the four reforms – of social security, health 
care, public administration and education – implemented by the government elected in 1997. 
The three main goals of the 1999 education reform were to increase the level of education in 
the society, to provide equal educational opportunities to everyone and to improve the quality 
of education (Bialecki, Johnson, and Thorpe 2002) 
The 1999 educational reform changed the structure of the system from nursery school to 
higher education. It also reformed the curricula and the examination, assessment and 
application systems. It affected the qualification requirements for teachers and school 
administration and financing. We only address the structural, curricular and examination 
changes in detail as these affected the pupils directly. 
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN 1999 
Undoubtedly, the most important structural change of 1999 was the one year increase in the 
length of comprehensive education. While the school starting age has not changed with this 
reform – it had been 7 for several decades and was only lowered to 6 in 2015 (Jakubowski 
2015) – the length and structure of compulsory education have changed (see figure 1). 
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Before 1999 general education consisted of a one track primary and secondary level school, 
the general school. This school lasted for 8 years, usually till age 15, but not longer than age 
17, the end of compulsory education. This 8-year general school was substituted by a 6-year 
primary school and a 3-year lower secondary school, the so-called gimnazjum. Thus, 
compulsory education has also been extended by one year, from age 17 to 18, until the end of 
the upper secondary level (see Jung-Miklaszewska 2003). 
The symbol of the 1999 reform was the new institution, the gimnazjum. The aim of its 
introduction was to provide the same education for one more year for all students and to 
track them one year later. One of the main goals was to increase the level of education in 
rural areas (Jakubowski et al. 2010). Fewer gimnazjum were established than primary 
schools, as they were only opened in larger settlements. Although the gimnazjum also admits 
students based on residence, those living in small villages must travel to one of the assigned 
larger settlements around them. The mixing of students with different backgrounds and skills 
is more visible in rural areas where one gimnazjum collects the children from neighbouring 
villages. However, after a gimnazjum accepted all pupils from its catchment area, it can admit 
the best applicants from other areas to fill remaining places. In urban areas, this sorting 
mechanism became more general since it is easier to choose between gimnazjum in more 
populated areas and to travel to a gimnazjum which is not the closest one (Bialecki 2005).  
The pre-reform general schools and the post-reform gimnazjum were followed by upper 
secondary tracks: academic secondary track or liceum, secondary vocational track or 
technikum and a basic vocational track. With the 1999 reform a fourth type of high school 
was introduced, the so-called profiled academic secondary track.  
The liceum lasted 4 years in the old system and offered academic education and ended 
with the maturity examination (matura), which gave access to tertiary education. These licea 
were specialized in mathematics and physics, humanities, biology and chemistry, general 
education, ecology or sports. The technikum lasted 4 or 5 years, provided more work-related 
education and graduates acquired a qualification as a technician. It was also completed by the 
maturity examination which could lead to higher education. The basic vocational school 
lasted 3 years, aimed to produce skilled workers by providing training in a particular field, 
offered only a vocational certificate. After this type of school students could complete their 
secondary studies in supplementary technical tracks, only after these supplementary studies 
could students take the maturity examination. 
During the 1999 reform, the liceum and technikum became one-year shorter, 3-years and 
4-years, respectively, but basic vocational schools remained 3 years long. This was to adjust 
to the one year longer general education. The new profiled general secondary school lasted 3 
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years as well, and besides general education, it offered specialization in vocational or 
academic subjects.2 
During the reform, 2-year supplementary academic and 3-year supplementary vocational 
secondary schools were also established.  These give the opportunity to graduates from basic 
vocational schools to complete their education at secondary level. At the end of these schools 
they obtain a certificate of completion of the given type of school, or if they take the maturity 
examination, are given a maturity certificate. 
Poland also signed the Bologna Declaration in 1999 along with 29 European countries; 
the typical three-level system of tertiary education – bachelor, master and doctorate – was 
thus introduced (Kwiek 2014). As a consequence, the first bachelor level graduates of the new 
system were entering the labour market around 2003, just around the time when the first 
1999 reform cohort is expected to enter the labour market (Jung-Miklaszewska 2003).3 
Figure 1.  
Pre- and post-reform structure of the Polish education system 
 
Source: Jakubowski et al. (2010:5) 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See for instance http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1213/Poland-SECONDARY-
EDUCATION.html  
3 This coincidence makes it hard for us to study the effect of the reform on the upper end of the 
education distribution. 
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The structural change was carried out gradually. Gimnazjum were already provided by 
September 1999, but the new system academic secondary schools, profiled academic 
secondary schools, vocational secondary schools and basic vocational schools were only 
established in 2002 while the supplementary general and technical secondary schools were 
opened in 2004. Therefore, until 2005, the secondary education institutions of the old system 
and the new upper secondary schools co-existed (Jung-Miklaszewska 2003). However, the 
cut-off was very clear-cut: those born before December 31. 1985. were to follow through in 
the old system, while those born after January 1. 1986. were to be educated in the new.4 As 
for tertiary education, until 2008, the old 5-year-long programmes also existed along the new 
bachelor and master programmes. In 2008, the 5-year programmes were abolished and kept 
only for the some specific fields of study (Kwiek 2014). 
The threshold in birth dates dividing the students studying in the old and new system was 
December 1985 – January 1986. Pupils born until 1985 followed the pre-reform curriculum; 
while those born in 1986 were the first who started their education in the newly established 
gimnazjum in 1999 and continued education completely in the new system. 
CURRICULAR CHANGES 
Before the transition, the general schools were required to follow a centrally determined 
curriculum. In the 1999 reform, a core curriculum was defined, which placed an emphasis on 
improving the skills and competencies of students (Wiśniewski 2001). The concept of core 
curricula extended the autonomy of schools and teachers, as general schools were to build 
their own core curricula around a centrally formulated core. Only the necessary skills and 
knowledge that students were to acquire by the end of their studies were determined. The 
curricula created by teachers needed to meet certain criteria; however the responsibility for 
the quality of education was delegated from the government to school level with this 
decentralization. Therefore, the examination and assessment system also needed to change in 
order to be able to evaluate the performance of schools (Jakubowski 2008). 
CHANGES IN THE EXAMINATION, ASSESSMENT AND ADMISSION SYSTEM 
Before 1999 students finished general school without any centralized exam taken during or at 
the end. However at the end of the 8th year they were obliged to write an entrance exam in 
each of the secondary schools they applied to. These examinations consisted of a test in 
Polish language and literature, mathematics and a chosen subject and were developed by the 
given liceum or technikum (Jung-Miklaszewska 2003). 
                                                 
4 Naturally, if one student born in 1985 repeated a class, s/he had to continue her/his studies in the 
new system. 
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Academic and vocational secondary schools were completed by the maturity examination. 
These exams were organised by the given schools and corrected by the teachers in these 
schools. A maturity exam written in the technikum was different from that written in a 
liceum, so the results were not comparable and, therefore, could not be taken into account 
when applying for higher education (Wiśniewski 2001). Thus, the requirements for 
admission to higher education institutions were to hold the certificate from the maturity 
examination and to pass the entrance examination. These entrance examinations varied 
between higher education institutions since each institution had its own selection system 
(Jung-Miklaszewska 2003). 
Therefore, in line with the curricular reform, the examination system also needed to 
change by moving towards a centrally developed and coordinated system. With the 1999 
reform, a low-stakes centralized test after the 6-year primary school was introduced. While 
this is low-stakes for the students, it is medium-stakes for schools as no financial strings are 
attached but their performance became comparable. The first test after the 6th year was 
carried out in 2002 (Jung-Miklaszewska 2003). 
The individually organised entrance exams to upper secondary schools were also replaced 
by a central exam at the end of gimnazjum. The admission to upper secondary schools 
depends on the results of this exam together with the grades in the final year of the subjects 
of the chosen field. However, apart from this, each upper secondary school works out its own 
rules for admission (Smoczyńska et al. 2014). 
Both types of tests are worked out and corrected by Regional Examination Boards in the 
framework of the standards set by the Central Examination Board since 2002. 
In line with the reform, the admission system to higher education institutions also 
changed. The admission to the bachelor level is now on based on the results of the centralized 
and standardized maturity examination (Smoczyńska et al. 2014). 
All in all, the examination system moved from internally organised examinations with 
non-comparable results to a system with external organisation and assessment. With this 
new construction the examination system became transparent, results became available for 
the students and teachers and the results at the school level became available for the public. 
According to Jakubowski (2015), this gave an incentive to schools to perform better, 
therefore to teachers to improve their teaching, and parents to choose better-performing 
schools for their children. 
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3. DATA 
The EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) consists of detailed data on 
income on personal and household level, as well as data concerning labour, education and 
health status. The population in the EU-SILC comprises private households with all 
household members surveyed but only over 16 years of age are people interviewed personally 
for income data. 
In this paper, we are utilizing the cross-sectional database of EU-SILC. The data from 
Poland are available between 2005 and 2013. The sample selection is conducted in a two-
stage process. The stratification is based on regions coded by NUTS 2. In the first stage, the 
population is divided into primary sampling units, from which a random sample of PSU-s is 
drawn. Then, in the second stage, every sampled PSU is divided into secondary sampling 
units and from every sampled PSU SSU-s are randomly drawn. Every household in a selected 
SSU is eligible for the sample (see Eurostat 2014). 
To generate a balanced “quasi-panel” we pool the cross-sectional datasets between 2005 
and 2013 and keep only those between ages 20-27. This allows us to compare pre-reform and 
post-reform participants: in the first survey year, 2005, the members of the youngest control 
group are 20 years old; and in the last survey year, 2013, the oldest treatment group 
members are 27 (see table 1 below). This means in the sample we have 16 cohorts, 8 in the 
treatment (T1 to T8) and eight in the control group (C1 to C8). These are people born 
between 1978 and 1993 (see also table A2 and A3 in the appendix). 
Table 1. 
Distribution of treatment and control group cohorts by age and year of survey5  
year of survey 
age 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
20 C1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 
21 C2 C1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 
22 C3 C2 C1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
23 C4 C3 C2 C1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
24 C5 C4 C3 C2 C1 T1 T2 T3 T4 
25 C6 C5 C4 C3 C2 C1 T1 T2 T3 
26 C7 C6 C5 C4 C3 C2 C1 T1 T2 
27 C8 C7 C6 C5 C4 C3 C2 C1 T1 
 
 
                                                 
5 For the number of observations, see the Appendix, table A2 
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There are in total 48557 observations in the sample with 23471 in the control group and 
25086 in the treatment group. In Poland, it is compulsory to start school in the year when the 
child turns 7. Thus, the threshold is 1 January 1986. In the sample everyone born in 1986 or 
later is considered as treated – to have studied in the new system -, and everyone born until 
31. December 1985. is considered as control. 
Concerning the educational attainment, we rely on the ISCED classification: those with 
ISCED 2 or below are considered as low-educated, those with ISCED 3 or 4 are at the 
medium level and those with ISCED 5 or above are highly educated. Unfortunately even these 
very rough categories are hard to compare before and after the reform (see descriptive 
statistics section below). 
Basic activity status in the EU-SILC classified into four categories: at work, unemployed, 
in retirement or early retirement, and other inactive. The first category covers those who 
work either full-time or part-time or is self-employed full-time or part-time. Students are 
considered inactive. When looking at employment chances we will compare employed people 
to the unemployed, as well as to the full population (inactive and unemployed merged). We 
will also run models on activity (active vs. inactive). We drop those in retirement or in early 
retirement as there are only 55 of these people in the full sample. 
Data on income is collected as gross current monthly earnings, before the deduction of 
taxes and social insurance contributions. The income data is given in Euros. We converted 
this data to Polish Zloty, and to 2005 prices. The number of years spent at work, henceforth 
experience, is counted as the number of years spent as an employee or self-employed since 
the respondent first began a regular job.6 
4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Before turning to the multivariate analysis it is useful to look at the descriptive results. As 
expected the distribution of age when highest education was achieved is different before and 
after the reform. While the EU-SILC does not provide information on the age when each level 
of education was attained, we can look at the age when the highest level of education was 
attained. The median age of finishing education for those who have attained only ISCED 2 or 
below is 16 after the reform while it was 15 for those before the reform. This is most likely due 
to the one year longer general (primary and lower secondary) education. On the other hand, 
there is not much difference between the control and the treated when we look at those, who 
have obtained ISCED 3. However, most likely due to the Bologna system, the post-reform 
                                                 
6 The summary of the variables can be found in the Appendix ( table A1). 
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tertiary educated (ISCED 5) people are likely to finish education much earlier than the pre-
reform cohort (see figure 2). 
When looking at the full population, it is also apparent that post-reform people tend to 
finish education a bit later than the pre-reform: as a result, they start their first job a bit later 
as well. This difference is the highest for the younger people. At age 20 and at 21 post-reform 
cohorts start their first job 4-5 months later, on average. This is probably due to those low-
educated, who stay another year in school. The difference in first job starting age disappears 
at later ages (see table 2). 
Surprisingly, however, a later job starting does not go negatively together with 
experience. That is, treated people of the same age tend to have higher years of experience 
than the control group (see table 3). 
This could be due to different employment chances, if post-reform cohorts have larger 
employment chances then – on average – they can gather more experience over a shorter 
period even if they start their first job at a later stage. Looking at the outcome measures it is 
obvious that there are large differences between the control and the treatment cohorts. For 
instance, people at age 20 are 12% more likely to be employed after the reform than before 
the reform. This difference slowly evaporates as people get older, but remains significant till 
age 22 and on average it is positive for the full sample. Moreover, this positive difference is 
even more pronounced for the low-educated (see table 4). The difference in employment 
chances, especially for the younger people, can explain the observed differences in 
experience. 
Looking at the wages, similar differences can be found (see figure 3 below). Treated 
people tend to earn a bit more on average, which is due mainly to the fact that there are fewer 
people in the treatment at the bottom of the wage distribution. That is, the earning 
distribution tilted to the right, moving those on the bottom of the distribution to the middle. 
This is apparent in the full cohort as well as on the sample of low-educated. 
From these descriptive statistics and from the research before us, we suspect that the 
1999 comprehensive education reform of Poland had a non-negligible and positive effect on 
the Polish labour market. We assume that all people after the reform benefited from it, but it 
was especially those on the bottom of the education distribution – the low–educated, low-
skilled – who stayed one more year in school, who benefited from the reform. 
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Figure 2. 
Distribution of ages when highest educational level was attained 
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Table 2. 
Ages when the control and treatment group members started their first job 
age when the first job began 
age control treated difference 
(st.err.) 
20 18.14 18.49 0.346 
   (0.136)** 
21 18.87 19.31 0.444 
   (0.096)*** 
22 19.52 19.70 0.176 
   (0.083)** 
23 20.00 20.02 0.020 
   (0.082) 
24 20.33 20.29 -0.041 
   (0.088) 
25 20.81 20.87 0.059 
   (0.099) 
26 21.12 21.21 0.084 
   (0.121) 
27 21.22 21.38 0.159 
   (0.167) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3. 
Mean years of experience by age 
mean experience in years 
age control treated difference 
(st.err.) 
20 0.79 0.85 0.064 
   (0.093) 
21 0.99 1.11 0.117 
   (0.066)* 
22 1.36 1.64 0.277 
   (0.061)*** 
23 1.83 2.22 0.385 
   (0.067)*** 
24 2.36 2.84 0.484 
   (0.078)*** 
25 2.79 3.24 0.451 
   (0.092)*** 
26 3.44 3.81 0.364 
   (0.118)*** 
27 4.23 4.40 0.172 
   (0.166) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. 
Percentage of employed people among those who are active (employed or 
unemployed) 
Full sample only ISCED 2 or below 
age control treated difference (st.err.) control treated difference 
(st.err.) 
20 0.518 0.639 0.121 0.407 0.593 0.186 
   (0.043)***   (0.098)* 
21 0.603 0.700 0.097 0.440 0.590 0.150 
   (0.025)***   (0.074)** 
22 0.704 0.763 0.059 0.584 0.711 0.127 
   (0.059)***   (0.069)* 
23 0.768 0.791 0.024 0.542 0.680 0.138 
   (0.017)   (0.077)* 
24 0.797 0.810 0.013 0.621 0.647 0.025 
   (0.017)   (0.076) 
25 0.822 0.816 -0.006 0.597 0.581 -0.016 
   (0.016)   (0.082) 
26 0.835 0.866 0.031 0.646 0.672 0.026 
   (0.016)**   (0.102) 
27 0.852 0.818 -0.034 0.597 0.413 -0.184 
   (0.024)   (0.136) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Figure 3. 
Distribution of real wages in 2005 PLN of treatment and control group 
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5. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Obviously, the descriptive statistics cannot uncover causal differences between the treated 
and the control groups, as the selection into treatment was not random. However, as 
selection to the treatment group was determined by the year of birth, we assume that there 
are no unobservable individual differences between the two groups: there must be cohort-
specific differences, which can be taken into account, since every member of the treatment 
group was born in later years than the members of the control group. Similarly, every survey 
year is different from the other: for example employment or wage outcomes recorded in the 
years of the great recession starting in 2008 must be different from the ones before. For this 
reason, we have opted for a difference-in-difference method where the age and the year of 
survey act as the two dimensions of the estimation (the first differences) and the treatment 
variable as the diff-in-diff (second difference) estimator. We use age and year of survey fixed 
effects in every regression. 
 
The baseline specification of the multivariate model is the following: 
 
 
 
where Y is the outcome variable (employment or wage) for each individual (i). Treat is the 
treatment dummy, which can vary across cohorts (a) and year-of-survey (s). X is a factor of 
individual level variables (gender, experience and level of education, in some specifications), 
and γ and δ are cohort and year of survey fixed effects, respectively. ε is the idiosyncratic 
error term, while α, β and ρ are parameters to be estimated. In the regressions in Table 5 
below, we also included a regional fixed-effects controlling for the potential differences in 
employment or wage composition across regions. 
The results underline the pattern in the descriptive statistics. The baseline models show 
that treated cohorts are over 3% more likely to be employed than the control, and receive 
almost 3% higher wages. We argue that this effect is due solely to the reform of 1999. 
Employment chances are not higher due to the higher activity rate of the treated, as there 
is no significant difference between the cohorts (in fact the post-treatment cohorts are less 
active if anything). Also, on average treated people are not likely to be more employed, when 
compared to the full population (unemployed and inactive).  
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If we control for the potential differences in the level of educational attainment across 
generations – which is not necessary, if we are to look for the full direct effect of the reform – 
the results show that it is the low-educated, who benefit most from the reform. Low-educated 
is over 10% more likely to be employed than unemployed, but they are also over 6% more 
likely to be employed than to be unemployed or inactive (studying). They also earn 6% more 
after than before the reform (these wage effects are not significant, but are reasonable in 
size). People with a medium level of education do not seem to benefit from the reform. It is 
only the post-reform highly educated that are significantly less likely to be active, which is 
most likely due to the Bologna reform. Post-reform cohorts are more likely to be studying 
(and thus inactive) while already having a tertiary level degree. 
Also, we must note, that while it is unlikely that the composition of the low-educated has 
changed much due to this reform of 1999, and thus the comparison of low-educated before 
and after the reform is meaningful, the composition of the tertiary educated has most likely 
changed due to the Bologna reform. There are more tertiary graduates (who are most likely to 
be younger and less skilled in average) after the Bologna reform, thus, the estimates of the 
treated higher educated cohort are likely to be biased upwardly (i.e. they are more negative 
that they should be), while the estimates of the treated medium educated are biased 
downwardly (towards zero). 
  
Table 5. 
The effect of the reform on labour market outcomes – linear models, full sample7 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
employed vs. 
unemployed 
employed vs. 
unemployed 
active vs. 
inactive 
active vs. 
inactive 
employed vs. 
all employed vs. all log wage log wage 
Treated 0.0342*** 0.103*** -0.0119 -0.0201 -0.000909 0.0658*** 0.0317** 0.0610 
 
(0.0102) (0.0268) (0.00946) (0.0176) (0.00983) (0.0182) (0.0156) (0.0439) 
Educ.: medium 
 
0.199*** 
 
0.0408*** 
 
0.159*** 
 
0.142*** 
  
(0.0182) 
 
(0.0136) 
 
(0.0148) 
 
(0.0268) 
Educ.. high 
 
0.261*** 
 
0.149*** 
 
0.293*** 
 
0.363*** 
  
(0.0200) 
 
(0.0149) 
 
(0.0172) 
 
(0.0270) 
Educ.: medium * Treated 
 
-0.0691*** 
 
0.0274 
 
-0.0572*** 
 
0.000438 
  
(0.0262) 
 
(0.0182) 
 
(0.0187) 
 
(0.0416) 
Educ.. high * Treated 
 
-0.0911*** 
 
-0.0437** 
 
-0.128*** 
 
-0.130*** 
  
(0.0279) 
 
(0.0216) 
 
(0.0220) 
 
(0.0445) 
Experience 
      
0.0509*** 0.0626*** 
       
(0.00568) (0.00564) 
Experience2 
      
-0.00493*** -0.00492*** 
       
(0.000650) (0.000626) 
Constant 0.564*** 0.408*** 0.342*** 0.316*** 0.192*** 0.0742*** 6.734*** 6.599*** 
 
(0.0212) (0.0269) (0.0127) (0.0170) (0.0141) (0.0181) (0.0320) (0.0428) 
Observations 24,393 23,269 39,187 37,560 39,233 37,605 15,450 15,447 
R-squared 0.049 0.067 0.174 0.181 0.158 0.174 0.193 0.223 
Regional fixed-effects y y y y y y y y 
Age fixed-effects y y y y y y y y 
Year-of-survey fixed effects y y y y y y y y 
Robust standard errors clustered for PSU*year in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
7 Results are robust to functional form specifications. Similar regressions using conditional logit estimates for the employed regressions provide substantively 
similar results (see Drucker 2015) 
  
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
As a first robustness check to the baseline results, we estimated the baseline models on all 
possible birth year and age range samples, to see how much the choice of the sample affects 
the results. Results in table 6 below show all estimated treatment beta parameters and their 
standard errors. The results mostly underline the main results of the full sample analysis: 
Treated cohorts (those born in 1986, in this case) are on average 2,3% more likely to be 
employed than unemployed as compared to the 1985 cohort. These results are significant or 
marginally significant in most of the samples and are very rarely point to the negative 
direction. Also, the effects are more pronounced for the low-educated people. On average 
treated low-educated people are 7,7% more likely to be employed. This result varies a bit over 
the different samples but is likely to be significant in most of them. Similarly, treated earn 
around 4% more, and low-educated earn 5,6% more. While results for all levels of education 
are mostly significant, the point estimates tend to have a higher standard error for the low-
educated sample. In short, this many sample analysis mostly confirmed the baseline full-
sample results – treated are more likely to be employed and earn more. 
An alternative robustness check to the baseline result is based on Kwon, Milgrom and 
Hwang (2010) idea of “detrending”. Assuming that there is a trend in the dependent variables 
and accepting that the treatment captures the average differences between before and after 
treatment the difference might reflect the trend and not the effect of the reform. As the 
number of cases in the very early and very late birth cohorts is very low (see table A3 in the 
appendix) we have restricted the sample to birth-years between 1983 and 1988 where the 
number of observations is still large. In Table 7 below we replaced the treatment variable 
with birth-year dummies, while still keeping the year of survey and age fixed effects in the 
sample. In models 1, 3, 5 and 7 in table 7 we compare each birth-cohort to the first, 1983, 
birth cohort. Apparently there is a solid trend in employment chances (employed vs. 
unemployed) as well as in real wages while there is no trend in activity rate and in 
employment chance when compared to the full population (unemployed and inactive 
together). In models 2, 4, 6 and 8 we drop the 1988 birth-year dummies, thereby “de-
trending” the dependent variables, and comparing each year between 1983 and 1988 to the 
mean of these two end years. If treatment has an effect, we should expect to see the year 1986 
to be significantly different from this joint mean. And this is exactly what we see: treated 
people are likely to benefit a positive employment effect and a positive wage effect of the 
reform. While these effects are somewhat lower than before (cca. 2% in employment and 
3,5% in wages) they are still significant and non-negligible.8 
                                                 
8 Moving the birth-year range by one or two years does not affect the substantive results in most of the 
cases. 
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Table 6. 
Robustness checks: estimating the baseline models on different birth-year and 
age ranges. Estimated treatment effects and their standard errors  
  
Employed vs. Unemployed Wage 
birth year range 
age 
range full sample low-educated full sample low-educated 
  
Treat, β s.e. beta s.e. Treat,β s.e. beta s.e. 
1978-1993 20-27 0.0342 (0.0102) 0.1028 (0.0268) 0.0317 (0.0156) 0.0610 (0.0439) 
1979-1992 20-27 0.0283 (0.0102) 0.0933 (0.0265) 0.0325 (0.0160) 0.0766 (0.0438) 
1980-1991 20-27 0.0244 (0.0105) 0.0726 (0.0277) 0.0257 (0.0167) 0.0677 (0.0451) 
1981-1990 20-27 0.0177 (0.0117) 0.0786 (0.0283) 0.0358 (0.0176) 0.0535 (0.0479) 
1982-1989 20-27 0.0148 (0.0128) 0.0620 (0.0316) 0.0258 (0.0190) 0.0375 (0.0496) 
1983-1988 20-27 0.0171 (0.0144) 0.0508 (0.0356) 0.0332 (0.0219) 0.0152 (0.0575) 
1984-1987 20-27 0.0041 (0.0184) -0.0265 (0.0438) 0.0626 (0.0276) 0.0798 (0.0719) 
1985-1986 20-27 0.0239 (0.0123) -0.0267 (0.0520) 0.0845 (0.0205) 0.0969 (0.0861) 
1978-1993 20-26 0.0427 (0.0113) 0.1106 (0.0267) 0.0356 (0.0172) 0.0427 (0.0470) 
1979-1992 20-26 0.0381 (0.0111) 0.1102 (0.0265) 0.0365 (0.0175) 0.0606 (0.0465) 
1980-1991 20-26 0.0318 (0.0112) 0.0925 (0.0278) 0.0348 (0.0180) 0.0590 (0.0481) 
1981-1990 20-26 0.0238 (0.0124) 0.0957 (0.0289) 0.0390 (0.0190) 0.0396 (0.0507) 
1982-1989 20-26 0.0141 (0.0136) 0.0676 (0.0320) 0.0340 (0.0202) 0.0284 (0.0528) 
1983-1988 20-26 0.0167 (0.0157) 0.0515 (0.0351) 0.0361 (0.0238) 0.0109 (0.0619) 
1984-1987 20-26 0.0058 (0.0200) -0.0241 (0.0430) 0.0594 (0.0286) 0.0736 (0.0792) 
1985-1986 20-26 0.0298 (0.0131) 0.0136 (0.0537) 0.0851 (0.0225) 0.0882 (0.0957) 
1978-1993 20-25 0.0396 (0.0130) 0.1169 (0.0291) 0.0313 (0.0205) 0.0286 (0.0537) 
1979-1992 20-25 0.0347 (0.0128) 0.1166 (0.0290) 0.0317 (0.0206) 0.0471 (0.0534) 
1980-1991 20-25 0.0297 (0.0131) 0.1066 (0.0300) 0.0384 (0.0209) 0.0603 (0.0546) 
1981-1990 20-25 0.0178 (0.0138) 0.1010 (0.0308) 0.0452 (0.0218) 0.0492 (0.0567) 
1982-1989 20-25 -0.0005 (0.0151) 0.0679 (0.0336) 0.0381 (0.0232) 0.0335 (0.0593) 
1983-1988 20-25 0.0001 (0.0175) 0.0477 (0.0368) 0.0405 (0.0267) 0.0263 (0.0673) 
1984-1987 20-25 -0.0096 (0.0223) -0.0283 (0.0451) 0.0413 (0.0324) 0.0735 (0.0860) 
1985-1986 20-25 0.0255 (0.0147) 0.0319 (0.0563) 0.0952 (0.0254) 0.1141 (0.1104) 
1978-1993 20-24 0.0504 (0.0153) 0.1260 (0.0329) 0.0324 (0.0254) 0.0023 (0.0644) 
1979-1992 20-24 0.0446 (0.0151) 0.1258 (0.0326) 0.0328 (0.0254) 0.0227 (0.0644) 
1980-1991 20-24 0.0390 (0.0154) 0.1157 (0.0336) 0.0401 (0.0259) 0.0374 (0.0655) 
1981-1990 20-24 0.0260 (0.0156) 0.1180 (0.0342) 0.0463 (0.0268) 0.0347 (0.0673) 
1982-1989 20-24 0.0080 (0.0169) 0.0876 (0.0362) 0.0376 (0.0276) 0.0225 (0.0701) 
1983-1988 20-24 0.0076 (0.0194) 0.0671 (0.0399) 0.0338 (0.0308) 0.0234 (0.0791) 
1984-1987 20-24 -0.0080 (0.0246) -0.0036 (0.0482) 0.0275 (0.0354) 0.0685 (0.0996) 
1985-1986 20-24 0.0321 (0.0165) 0.0519 (0.0577) 0.1038 (0.0292) 0.1326 (0.1240) 
1978-1993 20-23 0.0505 (0.0194) 0.1363 (0.0392) 0.0044 (0.0315) 0.0039 (0.0762) 
1979-1992 20-23 0.0454 (0.0193) 0.1377 (0.0389) 0.0043 (0.0315) 0.0273 (0.0758) 
1980-1991 20-23 0.0413 (0.0198) 0.1282 (0.0400) 0.0112 (0.0321) 0.0448 (0.0768) 
1981-1990 20-23 0.0270 (0.0199) 0.1331 (0.0404) 0.0145 (0.0331) 0.0386 (0.0783) 
1982-1989 20-23 0.0149 (0.0207) 0.1313 (0.0414) 0.0178 (0.0334) 0.0573 (0.0795) 
1983-1988 20-23 0.0226 (0.0234) 0.1174 (0.0469) 0.0147 (0.0375) 0.0649 (0.0869) 
1984-1987 20-23 -0.0165 (0.0306) 0.0263 (0.0569) 0.0024 (0.0447) 0.1193 (0.1013) 
1985-1986 20-23 0.0491 (0.0197) 0.1040 (0.0657) 0.1207 (0.0351) 0.2107 (0.1428) 
 
Mean 0.023 
 
0.077 
 
0.040 
 
0.056 
 
  
Table 7. 
The effect of the reform on labour market outcomes – de-trending, 1983 and 1988 cohorts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
employed vs 
unemployed 
employed vs 
unemployed 
active vs 
inactive 
active vs. 
inactive 
employed vs 
all 
employed vs. 
all log wage log wage 
                  
Year of birth = 1984 0.0133 0.00135 -0.0213* -0.0234** -0.00754 -0.0132 0.0586*** 0.00318 
 
(0.0126) (0.0113) (0.0128) (0.0114) (0.0136) (0.0120) (0.0188) (0.0168) 
Year of birth = 1985 0.0338*** 0.00990 0.0215 0.0174 0.0381*** 0.0267** 0.112*** 0.00101 
 
(0.0129) (0.0105) (0.0136) (0.0111) (0.0146) (0.0112) (0.0194) (0.0156) 
Year of birth = 1986 0.0573*** 0.0215* 0.00464 -0.00162 0.0337** 0.0166 0.203*** 0.0367** 
 
(0.0149) (0.0123) (0.0136) (0.0117) (0.0151) (0.0119) (0.0210) (0.0164) 
Year of birth = 1987 0.0732*** 0.0255* 0.00280 -0.00554 0.0340** 0.0112 0.199*** -0.0225 
 
(0.0170) (0.0136) (0.0146) (0.0122) (0.0161) (0.0117) (0.0261) (0.0194) 
Year of birth = 1988 0.0597*** 
 
0.0104 
 
0.0285 
 
0.277*** 
 
 
(0.0196) 
 
(0.0159) 
 
(0.0177) 
 
(0.0282) 
 Experience 
      
0.0663*** 0.0663*** 
       
(0.00756) (0.00756) 
Experience2 
      
-
0.00646*** -0.00646*** 
       
(0.000872) (0.000872) 
Constant 0.576*** 0.599*** 0.319*** 0.323*** 0.188*** 0.199*** 6.547*** 6.658*** 
 
(0.0331) (0.0286) (0.0211) (0.0179) (0.0223) (0.0185) (0.0516) (0.0466) 
         Observations 14,205 14,205 23,232 23,232 23,256 23,256 9,067 9,067 
R-squared 0.043 0.043 0.154 0.154 0.140 0.140 0.238 0.238 
region fixed-effect y y y y y y y y 
age fixed-effect y y y y y y y y 
year-of-survey fixed-effect y y y y y y y y 
Robust standard errors clustered for PSU*year in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The 1999 reform of the Polish education system has already been treated as a success story 
(Jakubowski et al. 2010; OECD 2010; Jakubowski 2015), however, no one has ever assessed 
its long-term labour market impacts. Similarly to two reforms during the 1950’s in Sweden 
and the 1970’s in Finland Poland has, among other things, decreased selection, lengthened 
compulsory schooling and imposed a national curriculum on schools. These changes in the 
education system of the Scandinavian countries have been shown to decrease inequality by 
increasing the earnings of the lower status people (see Meghir and Palme 2005; and 
Pekkarinen et al. 2009). 
Our results are in line with the Scandinavian results. Using difference-in-difference 
estimates we find that the 1999 reform in Poland was successful on the long-run. Post-reform 
cohorts are more likely to be employed and they also earn higher wages. These effects are 
likely to be driven by the lowest educated, which suggests that the reform has reached its 
initial goal of decreasing inequalities. These results are robust to sample selection and 
alternative specifications. 
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8. APPENDIX 
Table A1. 
Summary of independent variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
year of birth 48557 1985.7 3.60 1978 1994 
female 48557 0.48 0.50 0 1 
experience 26697 2.27 2.26 0 12 
age when the first job began  23186 20.28 2.47 8 27 
age 48557 22.87 2.57 19 27 
level of educ.: low 43057 0.18 0.39 0 1 
level of educ.: medium 43057 0.65 0.48 0 1 
level of educ.: high 43057 0.17 0.37 0 1 
treated 48557 0.52 0.50 0 1 
gross real wage (PLZ) 16762 1473 795 15 16939 
Labour market status 
at work 48557 0.44 0.50 0 1 
unemployed 48557 0.12 0.33 0 1 
retired 48557 0.00 0.03 0 1 
inactive 48557 0.43 0.50 0 1 
 
 
Table A2 
Number of observations in each age/year-of-survey cell 
 
year of survey 
 age 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
19 929 814 679 657 626 586 532 497 529 5,849 
20 843 821 732 623 572 569 538 499 485 5,682 
21 860 730 732 655 523 528 498 511 464 5,501 
22 926 773 687 655 546 539 518 496 486 5,626 
23 812 801 665 658 573 491 503 469 424 5,396 
24 746 708 732 618 582 523 495 489 420 5,313 
25 790 644 618 640 558 515 494 479 467 5,205 
26 708 676 587 555 567 534 499 495 465 5,086 
27 675 599 603 531 488 527 515 501 460 4,899 
Total 7,289 6,566 6,035 5,592 5,035 4,812 4,592 4,436 4,200 48,557 
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Table A3 
Number of observations in each year-of-birth/year-of-survey cell 
 
year of survey 
year of birth 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
1978 675 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 675 
1979 708 599 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,307 
1980 790 676 603 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,069 
1981 746 644 587 531 0 0 0 0 0 2,508 
1982 812 708 618 555 488 0 0 0 0 3,181 
1983 926 801 732 640 567 527 0 0 0 4,193 
1984 860 773 665 618 558 534 515 0 0 4,523 
1985 843 730 687 658 582 515 499 501 0 5,015 
1986 929 821 732 655 573 523 494 495 460 5,682 
1987 0 814 732 655 546 491 495 479 465 4,677 
1988 0 0 679 623 523 539 503 489 467 3,823 
1989 0 0 0 657 572 528 518 469 420 3,164 
1990 0 0 0 0 626 569 498 496 424 2,613 
1991 0 0 0 0 0 586 538 511 486 2,121 
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 532 499 464 1,495 
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 497 485 982 
1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 529 529 
Total 7,289 6,566 6,035 5,592 5,035 4,812 4,592 4,436 4,200 48,557 
 
 
 
